We study the problem of quantized consensus where some agents are subject to faults and attacks and might make updates arbitrarily. The network consists of integervalued agents under directed communication links. The misbehaving agents are assumed to be omniscient and may try to prevent the normal agents to reach consensus. We show that consensus can be achieved among the normal agents via a simple update scheme under which each normal agent ignores some of its neighbors' states taking unsafe values. We employ the connectivity notion of graph robustness and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for resilient consensus in a network with a known bounded number of faulty agents. It will be shown that randomization is essential both in quantization and in the updating times when normal agents interact in an asynchronous manner.
computations of the agents, and various studies have been carried out [1] [2] [3] [4] 9, 10, [12] [13] [14] 17, 21] . In particular, we employ a distributed update scheme in which each normal agent ignores its neighbors whose states appear unsafe in the sense that they differ the most from its own. By assuming that the maximum number f of malicious agents in the network is known, each normal agent neglects up to f largest and up to f smallest values from its neighbors. Such update schemes are often called mean subsequence reduced (MSR) type algorithms. We study the problem for both synchronous and asynchronous updates for the normal agents and obtain necessary and sufficient conditions in the underlying network structure for the agents' communication. The graph related notion relevant in this setting is called robustness, which is a measure of connectivity of graphs. It was first introduced by [16] for resilient consensus in the real-valued states case with first-order agent dynamics and then was further explored in [5, 26] . In [6] [7] [8] , we considered agent networks with second-order dynamics. Our viewpoint has been motivated by the recent literature in control on multi-agent systems and has led us to introduce features in the update schemes and communication delays different from those in computer science. On the other hand, the condition on graph structures may be relaxed by following an approach based on fault detection and isolation techniques; this will however require to equip the agents with banks of observers (e.g., [22] ).
We emphasize that the proposed update schemes employ probabilistic techniques in two aspects, which turn out to be critical. For a general reference on randomization-based algorithms in systems and control, we refer to [24, 25] . One is in the quantization. Since the update schemes involve iterative weighted averaging of integer-valued states, the resulting real number must be rounded by a quantizer. We employ quantizers that perform randomization. They have an effect similar to dithering, commonly used in image processing. It will be shown that deterministic quantizers are not sufficient. Related results can be found in [1, 3, 4, 12] , where quantized average consensus problems over undirected graphs with no malicious agent are considered.
The other part where randomization is utilized is in the updating times of the agents, which is sometimes called gossiping (see, e.g., [11, 23] ). It will be demonstrated that for asynchronous updates in the normal agents, gossiping is essential in establishing resilient consensus under the minimal robustness requirement in the agent network. In particular, with randomization in updating times, the necessary and sufficient condition coincides with that for the synchronous counterpart. We will show some scenarios under deterministic updates, where consensus fails on a graph with sufficient connectivity for the synchronous updates case. It is interesting to note that in computer science, randomization has been commonly used in consensus problems when adversaries are present [20] . The well-known impossibility result [18] exhibits that for Byzantine-type malicious agents, probabilistic techniques are necessary to obtain algorithms scalable in their convergence times with respect to the size of the networks.
The paper is outlined as follows: In Section II, we present preliminary material and introduce the problem setting. Section III is devoted to the quantized consensus problem in the presence of malicious agents when the update schemes for the normal agents are synchronous. The asynchronous counterpart is analyzed in Section IV. Finally, Section V discusses concluding remarks and future directions. Due to space reasons, proofs of some of the results are omitted in this conference version.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM SETUP

A. Graph Theory Notions
In this section, we recall some concepts on graphs [19] . A directed graph (or digraph) with n agents (n > 1) is defined as a triple G = (V, E, A) with the set of nodes V = {1, . . . , n}, the set of edges E ⊆ V × V, and the adjacency matrix A ∈ R n×n . The edge (j, i) ∈ E means that node i has access to the information of node j. If E = V × V, the corresponding graph is said to be complete. For node i, the set of its neighbors consists of all nodes which have directed edges toward i, and it is denoted by N i = {j : (j, i) ∈ E}. The degree of node i is the number of its neighbors and is denoted by d i = |N i |. If the edge (j, i) exists, the associated entry a ij in the adjacency matrix A is in (α, 1), and otherwise a ij is zero, where 0 < α < 1. We assume that n j=1,j =i a ij < 1. Let L = [l ij ] be the Laplacian matrix of G, whose entries are defined as l ii = n j=1,j =i a ij and l ij = −a ij , i = j. It is clear that the sum of the elements of each row of the Laplacian matrix is zero.
A path from node v 1 to v p is a sequence of distinct nodes
If for all distinct nodes i and j, there is path from i to j, the graph is strongly connected. A directed graph is said to have a directed spanning tree if there is a node having a path to every other node in the graph.
For MSR-type algorithms to achieve resilient consensus, the critical topological notion is graph robustness, which is a connectivity measure of graphs. Robust graphs have been introduced in [16] for analysis of resilient consensus of real-valued first-order multi-agent systems; see also [5] . Such graphs have also been used in the analysis of resilient consensus in [6] [7] [8] for real-valued second-order dynamics. We use the more general notion of (r, s)-robust graphs, which plays an important role to obtain a tight necessary and sufficient condition in our development.
Definition 1: The graph G = (V, E, A) is (r, s)-robust (r, s < n) if for every pair of nonempty disjoint subsets V 1 , V 2 ⊂ V, at least one of the following conditions hold: 
V is the set of nodes in V having at least r incoming edges from outside V . In particular, graphs which are (r, 1)robust are called r-robust.
The following lemma provides a better understanding of robust graphs [15] . For a more complete list of such properties, the reader can refer to [6, 15] .
Lemma 1: For an (r, s)-robust graph G, the following hold:
(iii) G has a directed spanning tree. Moreover a graph is 1-robust if and only if it has a directed spanning tree.
G is a complete graph, where the ceil function y gives the smallest integer value greater than or equal to y.
It is clear that (r, s)-robustness is stronger than rrobustness. The graph with seven nodes in Fig. 1 can be shown to be (2, 2)-robust, but not 3-robust. In general, to determine if a given graph enjoys a robustness property is computationally difficult since the problem involves combinatorial aspects. However, certain random networks are known to be robust when they are sufficiently connected [29, 27, 28] .
B. Integer-Valued Agents Consensus
Consider a network of agents cooperating over the directed graph G = (V, E, A). Each agent applies a control rule consisting of its neighbors' state values to make updates by
where x i [k] and u i [k] represent agent i's state and control at time k.
To achieve consensus means that the agents converge to a globally common value. In typical consensus problems, the agents are real-valued (i.e., x i [k] ∈ R), and they approach consensus asymptotically. A well-known approach for updating is to apply the weighted average of the relative state values of the agent and its neighbors as
where a ij [k] is the (i, j)th entry of the adjacency matrix A[k] of the graph G[k] at time k.
Here, we consider the situation where limited communication and memory of the agents enforce them to take discrete values. Thus, we employ the quantization function Q : R → Z to transform the real-valued input in (2) to an integer-valued one. In particular, we analyze the system with a probabilistic quantizer [1] given by
where p(y) = y − y and the floor function y gives the greatest integer less than or equal to y. Hence, agent i in (1) makes an update at time k by quantizing the control (2) as
with the state value It is noteworthy that the probabilistic quantizer equipped on each agent is independent and determines whether to choose the floor or ceil function at each time. Thus, in this respect, the protocol (4) is fully distributed. Probabilistic quantizers have been studied in [1, 3, 4, 12] for average consensus of real-valued agent networks with quantized communications. Moreover, it can be shown that probabilistic quantization is equivalent to the well-known dithering [1] , which has a range of applications in digital signal processing.
The objective of the agent network is to achieve global agreement among all agents by applying the local update protocol (4) in a probabilistic sense. In this work, the network is assumed to have some misbehaving agents that do not follow the update rule in (4). In the next subsection, we provide the required notions to study this case. Note that networks without any malicious agents form a special case of attacked networks. For such normal networks, we obtain consensus conditions as a direct consequence of the results given in the paper.
C. Resiliency Notions
We introduce notions related to malicious agents and consensus in the presence of such agents [5, 6, 16] .
Node i is called normal if it updates its state based on the predefined control (4). Otherwise, it is called malicious and may make arbitrary updates. The index set of malicious nodes is denoted by M ⊂ V. The numbers of normal agents and malicious agents are denoted by n N and n M , respectively. Also, the states for the normal agents and malicious agents are given in vector forms as
The malicious agents might deceive the normal agents and prevent to achieve consensus. We assume that an upper bound is available for the number of misbehaving agents in the network.
Definition 2: The network is said to be f -total malicious if the number n M of faulty agents is at most f , i.e., n M ≤ f .
We now introduce the notion of consensus for the network of probabilistic quantized first-order agents in the presence of misbehaving agents.
Definition 3: If for any initial states, any malicious inputs, and any possible set of malicious agents, the following conditions are met, then the network is said to reach resilient quantized consensus almost surely: 1) Safety condition: For each set of initial values of the normal agents, there exists a set S such that for all
III. RESILIENCE UNDER SYNCHRONOUS UPDATES
A. QW-MSR Algorithm
First, we outline the algorithm employed for achieving consensus in the presence of misbehaving agents. The algorithm is the quantized version of W-MSR studied in [5, 16] and thus will be referred to as the QW-MSR algorithm. More recently, resilient consensus of second-order agent networks has been considered in [6] [7] [8] .
The algorithm has three steps as follows: for all edges (j, i) which are neglected in step 2. The main feature of this algorithm lies in its simplicity. Each normal node ignores the information received from its neighbors which may be misleading. In particular, it ignores up to f edges from neighbors whose values are large, and f edges from neighbors whose values are small. The underlying graph G[k] at time k is determined by the edges not ignored by the agents. The adjacency matrix A[k] and the Laplacian matrix L[k] at time k are determined accordingly.
The problem considered in this section for the synchronous network can be stated as follows: Under the f -total malicious model, find a condition on the network topology such that the normal agents reach resilient quantized consensus almost surely using the QW-MSR algorithm outlined above.
B. Analysis
We are now ready to state the main result of this section. The theorem below provides a necessary and sufficient condition for resilient quantized consensus for synchronous updating times. It shows that robustness in the network is a key property to guarantee sufficient connectivity among the normal agents to avoid being misguided by the malicious agents. Let S be the interval given by
where the minimum and maximum are taken over all entries of vectors. This set will be shown to be the safety interval. Theorem 1: Under the f -total malicious model, the network of quantized agents reaches resilient quantized consensus almost surely through the QW-MSR algorithm if and only if the underlying graph is (f + 1, f + 1)-robust.
Due to space limitations, the sufficiency part of the proof is omitted. We just mention that to establish quantized consensus in this probabilistic setting, the full proof follows the arguments introduced in [13] . In the following, we restate Theorem 2 from this reference with minor modifications to accommodate our problem setup.
Lemma 2: Consider the network of quantized agents interacting over the graph G through the QW-MSR algorithm. Suppose that the following three conditions are met for the normal agents: (C1) There exists a set S such that for each normal agent i, 
Then, the network reaches quantized consensus almost surely.
The result in [13] holds for a general class of algorithms, but there it is given for the case of quantized average consensus. In the lemma above, it is adapted to the (regular) quantized consensus. In the full proof of Theorem 1, we show that the QW-MSR algorithm satisfies the conditions (C1)-(C3) in the lemma when it is applied to robust graphs. Intuitively, if the algorithm satisfies these conditions for normal agents, then the probable scenarios for reaching consensus occur infinitely often. This is because the probability for such an event to occur is positive based on the condition (C2).
Proof of Theorem 1: (Necessity) If the graph is not (f + 1, f + 1)-robust, the set of its nodes includes two disjoint and nonempty subsets V 1 and V 2 that do not meet any of the conditions in Definition 1. Thus, the total number of nodes in V 1 and V 2 that have at least f + 1 incoming edges from V \V 1 or V \V 2 , respectively, is less than f +1. Moreover, in each of them there are some nodes that have less than f + 1 incoming links from outside. Thus, we assume that the nodes in X f +1 V1 and X f +1 V2 are all malicious and
are two disjoint and nonempty subsets of normal agents. Now, assign a, b and (a + b)/2 to the nodes in V 1 , V 2 , and the rest of the nodes, respectively, where a, b ∈ Z and a < b − 1. Suppose that the malicious agents do not change their state values. Then, the normal agents in V 1 and V 2 will ignore all of their neighbors that have different values from themselves and they will stay at their states. Thus, the normal agents contained in V 1 \X f +1
V1
and V 2 \X f +1 V2 remain at the values a and b at all times, which is a contradiction with the agreement condition.
The (f + 1, f + 1)-robustness as a necessary and sufficient condition is consistent with the resilient consensus problems in [16] and [7] for the real-valued agent cases with first-order and second-order dynamics, respectively. However, these works consider consensus in real-valued agent networks and moreover without any randomization in their updates. This paper studies agents taking only quantized values and the convergence is in finite time in a probabilistic sense.
We now consider the special case when no malicious agent is present in the network. Then, the QW-MSR algorithm reduces to the update rule in (4) with a static matrix W . The following corollary of Theorem 1 demonstrates that in this case, to achieve quantized consensus, it is necessary and sufficient that a spanning tree exists in the network, which is the well-known topological condition for multiagent consensus when the states take real values [19] .
Corollary 1: When no malicious agent is present, the network of quantized agents based on the update rule (4) reaches quantized consensus almost surely if and only if the underlying graph has a directed spanning tree.
Proof: With f = 0, by Theorem 1, the necessary and sufficient condition for reaching consensus in normal networks is (1, 1)-robustness. Then, by Lemma 1 (iii), a graph is (1, 1)-robust, or 1-robust, if and only if it has a directed spanning tree.
C. Role of Probabilistic Quantization
Quantization is necessary in the update scheme (4) of the agents for keeping their states to take integer values from the weighted average of the neighbors' states. In this section, we show that randomization in the quantizers plays an important role in the consensus problem. Similar discussions can be found in, e.g., [1, 3, 4, 12] , but are focused on average consensus over undirected graphs.
First, to show the limitation of deterministic quantization even when no malicious agent is present in the network (i.e., f = 0), we use the line graph example in Fig. 2 . Suppose that in the update rules, the ceil quantizers Q(y) = y are used instead of the probabilistic ones. Let agent i take an initial value of x i [0] = i for all i. Then, we easily conclude that the agents stay at their initial states for all times and thus consensus is impossible. A similar argument holds for the truncation quantizer Q(y) = y by changing the initial values to x i [0] = n−i. Note however that line graphs contain spanning trees. It is clear that neither ceil nor truncation 1 n 2 Fig. 2 . A line graph with no malicious agent fails to reach consensus with ceil quantizers when the initial value for node i is taken to be its index i. is sufficient in such examples and we need a combination of both with a suitable switching mechanism. This can be achieved by means of the probabilistic quantizers in (3).
Next, we provide an example with a malicious agent. The network in Fig. 3 with five nodes is (2, 2)-robust. We set f = 1 and take agent 5 to be malicious. This agent keeps its value unchanged from the initial time. The values of the agents are initialized as x[0] = [2 2 2 3 5] T . Using ceil quantizers in QW-MSR forces each normal agent to stay at its initial value and hence no consensus is reached. In this case, the malicious agent 5 is ignored at all times since it is set to the largest value. It is interesting to notice that removal of node 5 from the graph in Fig. 3 results in a graph with a spanning tree. We can reach similar conclusions with truncation quantization by initializing the values as x[0] = [4 4 4 3 1] T .
IV. RESILIENCE UNDER ASYNCHRONOUS UPDATES
In this section, we consider asynchronous update schemes for two cases depending on how the normal agents choose their updating times: Deterministic and probabilistic.
A. Deterministic Scheme
In asynchronous updates, each normal agent i at time k may or may not make an update. When no update is made, the control input simply becomes u i [k] = 0 and thus the state remains unchanged as
In the deterministic setting, it is assumed that each normal agent i makes an update at least once in k time steps, that is,
On the other hand, malicious agents need not follow this rule and may be aware of the updates of the whole network.
The following theorem states a sufficient condition for this case again in terms of graph robustness, but with a more restrictive requirement than Theorem 1.
Theorem 2: Under the f -total malicious model, the network of asynchronous quantized agents satisfying (6) reaches resilient quantized consensus almost surely through the QW-MSR algorithm if the underlying graph is (2f + 1)-robust. A complete graph which is (3, 3)-robust, but fails to reach consensus under asynchronous updates when agents 1 and 2 are malicious.
It is noted that a (2f +1)-robust graph is also (f +1, f +1)robust by Lemma 1. This indicates that there is a gap between Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 for the synchronous scheme and the asynchronous scheme, respectively. This gap originates from the fact that asynchrony in the updating times creates more ways for malicious agents to deceive the normal agents.
The proof of Theorem 2 is omitted due to space reasons, but follows along similar lines as that of Theorem 1. Here, we discuss why the sufficient condition for the case of asynchronous normal agents is more restrictive than the case of synchronous agents. Consider the 6-node complete graph illustrated in Fig. 4 . This graph is (3, 3)-robust due to Lemma 1 (iv). In this graph, agents 1 and 2 are taken to be malicious. They switch their values according to x i [2m] = i and x i [2m+1] = i+6 for m ∈ Z + . For each agent i, let's assign x i [0] = i. Also, assume that agents 3 and 4 make updates only at even time steps (k = 2m) and agents 5 and 6 make updates only at odd time steps (k = 2m + 1). By applying the QW-MSR algorithm, we observe that with probability 1, agents 3 and 4 reach agreement among themselves (at either 3 or 4), and agents 5 and 6 agree upon a different value (at either 5 or 6). Here, although the underlying graph is complete, the agents cannot reach consensus because the graph is not sufficiently robust. Using Lemma 1 (iv) and the above results, we note that it is impossible to reach consensus in f -total malicious models with asynchronous updates and any scenario of updates and adversaries when the graph has less than 4f + 1 nodes. However, when the normal agents make updates synchronously, having a complete graph with 2f + 1 nodes is sufficient to reach consensus.
We would like to relax this gap in the synchronous and asynchronous updates. As seen in the above example, since the normal agents 3 and 4 make updates at time steps when the normal agents 5 and 6 are in idle mode, the malicious agents take advantage of this asynchrony and appear at different states at the times of their updates. For example, at the time of updates, agents 3 and 4 receive values x 1 [k] = 1 and x 2 [k] = 2 from the malicious agents 1 and 2. Then, the values from agents 1, 2, 5, and 6 are ignored.
Such an undesirable situation can be avoided, for example, if there is a chance that all normal agents make updates at the same time. This in fact allows us to obtain (f +1, f +1)robustness as a necessary and sufficient condition for resilient consensus. This can be shown by following an argument similar to that in Theorem 1. To this aim, we make use of randomized update times.
B. Probabilistic Scheme
Here, we assume that each normal agent i makes an update at each time k ≥ 0 with probability p i ∈ (0, 1] in an i.i.d. fashion. That is, for agent i, the incoming edge (j, i) from its neighbor agent j ∈ N i is activated at time k as
Note that with such updates, the algorithm remains distributed. Even the probabilities p i need not be identical. An advantage of introducing randomization for the normal agents is that the malicious agents cannot predict the update times in advance. In this respect, randomization in update times can be utilized as a defensive means against potential conspiracy of the malicious agents. Moreover, there always is nonzero probability that any normal agents in the system update their states. This feature enables us to establish a result stronger than that for the deterministic case.
The following theorem is the main result of this section. It shows that for the probabilistic updating scheme, the requirement on graph robustness is the same as that for the synchronous case in Theorem 1.
Theorem 3: Under the f -total malicious model, the network of randomly asynchronous quantized agents satisfying (7) reaches resilient quantized consensus almost surely through the QW-MSR algorithm if and only if the underlying graph is (f + 1, f + 1)-robust.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the problem of quantized consensus in the presence of malicious agents has been considered for synchronous and asynchronous update schemes. The necessary and sufficient conditions for reaching consensus among non-faulty agents have been derived based on the graph robustness notion. We have made use of randomization in quantization as well as in the update times to obtain tight topological conditions on the underlying graph. In future research, we will extend our results to incorporate communication delays in the agent interactions.
